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Scott v Williams concerned s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. In situations of significant 
economic disparity post-separation, s 15 empowers courts to depart from the default rule of equal 
division of relationship property to compensate the disadvantaged partner. Causation is one of the 
jurisdictional hurdles. Only disparity "because of" the division of functions (DOF) is compensable. 
Thus far, courts have adopted a strict causation approach by placing a costly and often unattainable 
evidential burden on claimants. Consequently, compensation has been beyond reach for deserving 
claimants. Responding to this disquiet, Scott's majority propounded a "working assumption" of 
causation in relationships conducted along traditional lines, where one party assumes primary 
responsibility for domestic duties and the other for income-earning. In such situations, Scott's 
majority would assume causation at jurisdiction and attribute the entire disparity to the DOF when 
determining the quantum award. This article concludes that the working assumption is a positive 
development in terms of jurisdiction. However, unlike the majority, it argues that striking the correct 
balance between s 15's "because of" wording and broad policy rationale requires an apportionment 
of causes at quantum. Furthermore, Scott's "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology 
creates unnecessary confusion and should be eschewed. 
  
*  Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 2018. Awarded 
the Robert Orr McGechan Memorial Prize for the Best Student Work for the Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review. I am extremely thankful to my supervisor, Professor Bill Atkin, for his wisdom, support and 
guidance. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Scott v Williams considered s 15 of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) for the first time.1 All five judges delivered judgments on s 15. 
The PRA's default rule of equal division of relationship property was progressive when 
introduced.2 However, it soon became appreciated that this basis of "formal equality had failed 
somewhere, and that … substantive equality ought to be considered".3 Section 15, enacted in the 
PRA's 2001 reform, reflects this.4 It empowers courts to depart from equal division if satisfied that:5 
after the … relationship ends, [party B's] … income and living standards … are likely to be significantly 
higher than [party A's] … because of the effects of the division of functions [(DOF)] within the … 
relationship while the [parties] … were living together. 
A two-step analysis is required: (1) jurisdiction (when an award can be made); and (2) quantum 
(how much to award). One of the jurisdictional hurdles is causation. Only disparity because of the 
DOF is compensable. The DOF need not be the principal cause,6 or even a real and substantive cause.7 
All jurisdiction requires is "a clear causal link";8 that the DOF is a cause of the disparity. 9 
Nevertheless, many courts have adopted a strict approach to causation.10 Consequent difficulties in 
establishing causation were identified as a key reason11 for widespread disappointment that s 15 "has 
not lived up to expectations".12 
Responding to this disquiet, Scott's majority on causation (Arnold and Glazebrook JJ and Elias 
CJ) shifted from this strict approach and propounded a "working assumption" of causation in certain 
  
1  Scott v Williams [2017] NZSC 185, [2018] 1 NZLR 507. 
2  See generally Bill Atkin Relationship Property in New Zealand (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018) at 3. 
3  M v B [2006] 3 NZLR 660 (CA) at [215]. 
4  Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001, s 17.  
5  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 15(1) (emphasis added).  
6  M v B, above n 3, at [201]. 
7  Atkin, above n 2, at 110. 
8  X v X [Economic disparity] [2009] NZCA 399, [2010] 1 NZLR 601 at [108]. 
9  Atkin, above n 2, at 110. 
10  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change? Te mātatoha rawa tokorau – Kua eke te 
wā? (NZLC IP41, 2017) at [18.60]; and Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [442] per William Young J. 
11  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, at [19.23]. 
12  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [279] per Arnold J. 
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circumstances. This dictum was obiter as jurisdiction was conceded before the Supreme Court13 but 
it will be highly persuasive.14 Furthermore, causation is intertwined with quantum; an issue squarely 
before the Court.  
Unfortunately, the judgments leave many unanswered questions. This article proposes some 
answers while critically analysing whether the assumption is a positive development. It concludes that 
the assumption is a positive development in respect of the jurisdictional causation hurdle, but argues 
that striking the correct balance between s 15's strict "because of" wording and broad policy rationale 
requires an apportionment of causes when determining compensable disparity at quantum. In this 
latter respect, it differs from Scott's majority. It also suggests that Scott's "traditional lines" and "non-
career partner" terminology should be eschewed. Therefore, it argues for the proposition that, where 
party A undertakes primary responsibility for domestic duties and party B for income-earning, there 
is an assumption that a causal link between the DOF and disparity exists. This is sufficient to satisfy 
the jurisdictional hurdle. The strength of this assumed causal link, as against other causes, should be 
apportioned and reflected in the quantum awarded.  
This article does not analyse all of s 15's elements, resolve problems created by its conceptual 
inconsistencies15 and inadequate legislative process,16 or comment on all aspects of Scott. Its specific 
focus is the "working assumption". By unpacking the assumption and working through its rough 
edges, this article aims to help readers understand this judicial innovation and suggests how it could 
be improved. 
It must be noted that the New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) is currently undertaking a PRA 
reform project.17 Its Issues Paper, published two months before Scott, proposed three s 15 reform 
options.18 
• Option 1 was to retain s 15 but "lower the hurdles that … [party] A must overcome".19 This 
included, inter alia, removing the requirement to establish causation and replacing it with "a 
  
13  At [159] per Glazebrook J. 
14  Atkin, above n 2, at 121. 
15  See Bill Atkin "Economic disparity – how did we end up with it? Has it been worth it?" (2007) 5 NZFLJ 299; 
and Joanna Miles "Dealing with Economic Disparity: An Analysis of Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 
1976" [2003] NZ Law Review 535. 
16  See Ashley Varney "Divorcing Rhetoric from Reality: A Law Reform and Policy Perspective on Section 15 
of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2017). 
17  Law Commission "Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976" <www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-projects>. 
18  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [19.5]. 
19  At [19.5(a)].  
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rebuttable presumptive entitlement to compensation if there was financial inequality and a 
[DOF]".20 
• Option 2 was to repeal s 15 and "address financial inequality in other PRA rules".21 
• Option 3 was to replace s 15 with "financial reconciliation orders" intended to be a "hybrid" 
of s 15's compensatory provisions and the Family Proceedings Act 1980's (FPA) needs-based 
maintenance regime.22 
Following a public consultation period, the NZLC published its Preferred Approach Paper (PAP) 
in November 2018. The PAP sets out a "package of reforms that [the NZLC] … intend[s] to 
recommend to the Government in 2019".23 During the consultation, "[s]ubmitters were generally 
divided between favouring Option 1 and Option 3".24 Based on these results, the NZLC's current 
preferred approach is to repeal s 15 and the FPA's maintenance regime in favour of a Family Income 
Sharing Arrangement (FISA).25 The FISA regime reflects "a new way to share the economic 
advantages and disadvantages arising from a relationship or its end"26 by providing a "limited 
entitlement to share future family income" in qualifying circumstances.27 The proposal is a "hybrid" 
of the NZLC's original Option 1 and Option 328 and is set out below:29 
[Party] A … should be entitled to a FISA [(determined using a statutory formula)] in the following 
[qualifying] circumstances: 
a.  the partners have a child together; or 
b.  the relationship was 10 years or longer; or 
c.  during the relationship: 
  
20  At [19.5(a)]. The "financial inequality" terminology reflects another New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) 
proposal. The NZLC proposed "[r]eplacing the narrow concept of economic disparity with financial 
inequality", choosing to focus on disparities in income or other financial resources rather than on living 
standards: at [19.8]–[19.9].  
21  At [19.5(b)]. 
22  At [19.5(c)]. 
23  Law Commission "Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976", above n 17. 
24  Law Commission Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: Preferred Approach – Te Arotake i te 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976: He Aronga i Mariu ai (NZLC IP44, 2018) at [5.34]. 
25  At [5.42]. 
26  At 99. 
27  At [P18]. 
28  At [5.44]. 
29  At [P19]. 
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(i)  … [party] A stopped, reduced or did not ever undertake paid work, took a lesser paying job 
or declined a promotion or other career advancement opportunity, in order to make 
contributions to the relationship; or 
(ii)  … [party] B was enabled to undertake training, education and/or other career sustaining or 
advancing opportunities due to the contributions of … [party] A to the relationship. 
However, critically analysing the s 15 judgments in Scott remains a worthwhile exercise. After 
all, the proposed FISA regime seemingly draws on Scott's causation analysis. If any of the FISA's 
qualifying circumstances apply, causation is to "be deemed" and the onus is to be reversed to party B 
to "show [that] the circumstances of the relationship did not result in economic advantage or 
disadvantage".30 This, like Scott's working assumption, is a presumption of causation and the FISA's 
qualifying circumstances reflect the concept of a DOF along "traditional lines" which was at the heart 
of the Scott decision.31 Furthermore the NZLC, in proposing a presumption of causation (albeit in the 
FISA context), was driven by the same desire to ameliorate "the difficulties experienced in [proving] 
causation under [s] 15"32 as Scott's majority judges were when they propounded the working 
assumption.33 In any event, until and unless legislative reform occurs, s 15 remains and Scott will 
have significant implications for such cases whether litigated or negotiated in the shadow of the law. 
II DECIPHERING THE WORKING ASSUMPTION 
A Majority 
1 When does it arise? 
The majority agreed that a rebuttable assumption of causation will arise in certain circumstances. 
What these circumstances are is unclear. There is support in all three judgments that causation is 
assumed if there was (1) significant disparity; and (2) a DOF.34 However, the real tenor of Arnold J's 
judgment was his repeated reference to role-divisions "along traditional lines" when formulating the 
assumption.35 On this formulation, causation is assumed if there was (1) significant disparity; (2) a 
  
30  At [5.52] (italics omitted). 
31  See Part II(A) below. 
32  At [5.52].  
33  See Parts IV–V below. 
34  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [203], n 290 and [264] per Glazebrook J, [291] per Arnold J and [345] and 
[356] per Elias CJ.  
35  At [293]–[294], [311] and [314] per Arnold J. 
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DOF; and (3) the DOF was along traditional lines. This distinction is worth grappling with as the 
question of what qualifies as "traditional" can create confusion.36  
Despite the uncertainty, it is likely Scott's assumption will be interpreted as requiring a 
relationship conducted along traditional lines ("traditional DOF relationship"). Arnold J provided the 
assumption's fullest exposition and his reasoning emphasised this requirement.37 Glazebrook J38 and 
Elias CJ39 also provide some support for this formulation. Furthermore, in expressing their 
disagreement, the minority conceptualised the assumption as arising in traditional DOF 
relationships.40 Thus it is important to understand what constitutes "traditional lines". 
2 Traditional lines 
This requirement does not require a traditional type of relationship (heterosexual marriage). 
Rather, it requires a traditional DOF.41 Scott interprets a traditional DOF as "one party … assuming 
the primary responsibility for home-making and child-care … and the other assuming responsibility 
for income-earning".42 Past cases adopted similar interpretations.43 This requirement's parameters are 
analysed in Part VI. 
3 A legal presumption 
The "working assumption" terminology was likely used as a synonym for a legal presumption. 
Scott's language of rebutting,44 negativing45 and displacing46 the assumption is evocative of other 
legal contexts containing rebuttable presumptions.47 Glazebrook J further reinforced this by using the 
  
36  At [382] per O'Regan J; and Atkin, above n 2, at 111. See also Part VI below. 
37  See for example Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [293]–[294], [311] and [314] per Arnold J. 
38  At [203], n 290 and [204], n 292 per Glazebrook J, citing [293] and [307]–[323] per Arnold J.  
39  At [356] per Elias CJ agreeing with Arnold J's broad causation approach. 
40  At [385] per O'Regan J and [444] per William Young J. 
41  At [293] per Arnold J. 
42  At [282] per Arnold J, [264] per Glazebrook J and [331] per Elias CJ agreeing with [264] per Glazebrook J. 
43  See for example CRH v GDH DC Auckland FAM-2007-004-1129, 24 December 2008 at [1]; and Jack v Jack 
[2014] NZHC 1495 at [52]. 
44  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [264] per Glazebrook J. 
45  At [293] and [324] per Arnold J. 
46  At [323] per Arnold J. 
47  Atkin, above n 2, at 111. 
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terms interchangeably.48 Creating a rebuttable presumption has implications for matters of proof. Part 
V(C) explores these implications. 
B Minority 
Analysing O'Regan and William Young JJ's dissents require understanding the assumption's two-
fold relevance to jurisdiction (assuming causation to satisfy the jurisdictional hurdle); and quantum 
(the extent of causation assumed in determining compensable disparity). 
As discussed below, the impetus for the majority's assumption and the NZLC's proposals was the 
strict causation approach, which undermined s 15's spirit.49 Like the majority and NZLC, one senses 
O'Regan J was not particularly pleased with the pre-Scott direction of causation.50 In fact, he believed 
that the NZLC's Option 1 provided a "good case for reform".51 However for him, the solution was 
legislative reform to remove the "because of" wording rather than a judge-made assumption.52 He 
considered assumptions "contrary to [s 15's] … current ['because of'] wording".53 William Young J 
indicated similar disapproval.54 
The minority's more vociferous critique concerned the assumption's relevance to quantum. The 
starting point of the Supreme Court's new disparity-based quantum methodology, is "the extent of the 
disparity resulting from the [DOF]".55 The majority believed that where the assumption was not 
displaced, "the [entire] disparity should be attribut[ed] to the [DOF]" ("no-apportionment 
approach").56 The minority considered this contrary to s 15's wording that only disparity caused by 
  
48  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [204] and [204], n 293 per Glazebrook J. 
49  See Parts IV–V below. See also Law Commission Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: Preferred 
Approach, above n 24, at [5.52] where the NZLC cite the "difficulties experienced in [proving] causation 
under [s] 15" as justifying what is essentially a presumption of causation in the proposed FISA regime. 
50  See Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [380]–[381] per O'Regan J. 
51  At [380] per O'Regan J. 
52  At [380] per O'Regan J. 
53  At [382] per O'Regan J. 
54  At [446] per William Young J. 
55  At [326(a)] per Arnold J. 
56  At [326(a)], n 420 per Arnold J, [204] and [264] per Glazebrook J and [331] per Elias CJ agreeing with [264] 
per Glazebrook J. See also at [444(c)] per William Young J conceptualising no-apportionment as the 
majority's approach. 
84 (2019) 50 VUWLR 
the DOF is compensable.57 As later discussed, this article agrees with the minority's apportionment 
reasoning.58 
III THE VALIDITY OF THE WORKING ASSUMPTION 
Arnold J validated his assumption of causation based on three underlying assumptions.59 He said 
it should be assumed that a traditional DOF "(a) was for the benefit of both parties; (b) restricted [party 
A's] … income-earning ability; and (c) enhanced [party B's] … earning ability".60 
Assumption (a) endorses what is sometimes called X v X [Economic disparity] 's "presumption of 
causation".61 Strictly speaking, this simply presumes the DOF was a mutual choice.62 Through 
assumptions (b) and (c) Scott goes further than X v X and assumes the causation hurdle itself is 
satisfied. Assumptions (b) and (c) reflect the common bases for s 15 claims before Scott, founded on 
party A's restricted (or diminished) income-earning ability, and/or party B's enhanced income-earning 
ability, because of the DOF.63  
Arnold J noted that assumptions (b) and (c) reflect international research.64 It is beyond this 
article's scope to comprehensively explore the socio-economic evidence-based justifications of 
assumptions (b) and (c). International research on post-separation disparity is extensive.65 A brief 
  
57  At [384]–[385] per O'Regan J and [446] and [449]–[450] per William Young J. 
58  See Part V(B) below.  
59  At [311] per Arnold J. 
60  At [311] per Arnold J. 
61  Mark Henaghan and others Family Law in New Zealand (18th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2017) at 1106. 
62  At 1106. 
63  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [290] per Arnold J. 
64  At [311]–[313] per Arnold J. 
65  See for example Hans-Jürgen Andreß and others "The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution – 
A Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden" (2006) 
22 Eur Sociol Rev 533, as cited in Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New 
Zealand: He Hononga Tangata, He Hononga Whānau I Aotearoa O Nāianei (NZLC SP22, 2017) at 60, n 
399; David de Vaus and others The economic consequences of divorce in six OECD countries (Australian 
Institute of Family Studies, Research Report No 31, March 2015); AR Poortman "Sex differences in the 
Economic Consequences of Separation: A Panel Study of the Netherlands" (2000) 16 Eur Sociol Rev 367, as 
cited in Michael John Fletcher "An investigation into aspects of the economic consequences of marital 
separation among New Zealand parents" (PhD Thesis, Auckland University of Technology, 2017) at 70; and 
Pamela J Smock "Gender and the Short-Run Economic Consequences of Marital Disruption" (1994) 73 Social 
Forces 243.  
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discussion is sufficient, drawing primarily on the NZLC's66 and Green's67 recent and extensive 
analyses of these socio-economic trends. Arnold J utilised both analyses.68 
Internationally, and in New Zealand, women take longer than men to recover economically post-
separation.69 International studies identify the traditional DOF between paid and unpaid work as 
contributing to this disparity70 with one study concluding that "hours worked per week prior to 
separation can explain approximately 41 [per cent]" of the gender pay-gap post-separation.71 
Additionally, extensive socio-economic research suggests that marriage enhances male earning 
capacity.72 The reason for this is that these men "are able to [earn more by] specialis[ing] in making 
money" without being burdened by domestic duties undertaken by their wives.73  In New Zealand, 
despite increasing female workforce participation, men still spend significantly more time than 
women in paid employment, while women spend almost twice as much time as men on domestic 
work.74 Thus to the extent that these international studies can be transposed in a New Zealand context, 
the statistics suggest assumptions (b) and (c) are valid. 
The reliance on this research could be criticised as it primarily speaks in the context of a 
heterosexual marriage with a housewife and breadwinning husband. After all, s 15 does not preclude 
claims from male, de facto or civil union partners. However, this research remains applicable because 
New Zealand's society is still such that most s 15 cases have involved, and in the foreseeable future 
will continue to involve, female claimants in heterosexual marriages.75 
Economists have also doubted the usefulness of blanket statistics as "their high degree of 
aggregation [can] hid[e] large differences in the experiences of individual divorced men and 
women".76 However, these concerns do not invalidate the working assumption. A presumption's 
  
66  Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New Zealand, above n 65. 
67  Claire Green "The impact of section 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 on the vexing problem of 
economic disparity" (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2013). 
68  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [312] per Arnold J. 
69  Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New Zealand, above n 65, at 60. 
70  At 60.  
71  Fletcher, above n 65, at 70, citing Poortman, above n 65. 
72  Green, above n 67, at 298. 
73  At 76 (footnote omitted). 
74  Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New Zealand, above n 65, at 44.  
75  See generally Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New Zealand, above n 65, at 
44 and 60. 
76  Susan St John "Income expectations of men and women after separation" (paper presented to the Family Law 
Conference, Wellington, October 1995) at 23, as cited in Atkin, above n 2, at 101. 
86 (2019) 50 VUWLR 
function is to "reflec[t] what is regarded as most convenient in terms of bringing an issue to proof". 77 
Its contents "reflect what was probably [likely] … in the circumstances prevailing at the time of [its] 
… articulation"78 and it simply allows courts to "draw a particular inference from a particular fact, … 
unless … disproved".79 Given s 15 only requires the DOF be a cause, rather than a principal, or real 
and substantive cause, the socio-economic research indicates that the assumption is not unfounded. In 
the usual traditional DOF relationship, some causal link is likely due to the DOF restricting party A's, 
and/or enhancing party B's, income-earning capacity. If specific relationships deviate from this likely 
position, the assumption can be rebutted. However in the usual situation, the assumption removes 
party A's need to positively prove causation, which has hitherto proved difficult. As explored below, 
to the extent that this puts compensation within reach for deserving claimants, the assumption is a 
positive development.80 
Furthermore, validating the working assumption based on underlying assumptions of restricted 
(or diminished), and enhanced, earning capacity may appear incongruous given the Supreme Court 
criticised the "diminution" and "enhancement" categories at quantum.81 The criticism was that these 
categories lead to awards compensating party A's loss, or redistributing party B's enhancement, 
without compensating for relative disparity as s 15 requires.82 However in validating what underlies 
the assumption of causation, this article, like the majority, uses the "restricted" and "enhancement" 
terminology.83 This provides a useful mechanism to understand why causation can be assumed, as 
disparity caused by the DOF is necessarily because the DOF restricted party A's earning capacity 
and/or enhanced party B's. Because the socio-economic research confirms that traditional DOF 
relationships do have this effect, jurisdictional causation can safely be assumed. It is simply that 
quantum no longer turns on precise diminution or enhancement amounts.  
  
77  CEF Rickett "The Classification of Trusts" (1999) 18 NZULR 305 at 316. 
78  At 316. 
79  Courtenay Ilbert in Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed, 1910) vol 10 Evidence at 15, as cited in Nicholas 
Rescher Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2006) at 2. 
80  See Parts IV–V(A)(1) below. 
81  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [347]–[352] and [357]–[358] per Elias CJ. See also at [197] and [204] per 
Glazebrook J, [293]–[294], [323] and [326] per Arnold J and [385] per O'Regan J. 
82  At [347] per Elias CJ.  
83  See at [203] per Glazebrook J, [311] per Arnold J and [345] per Elias CJ. 
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IV THE IMPETUS FOR THE WORKING ASSUMPTION 
Before Scott, "a few cases" took a broad approach to causation using reasoning similar to that of 
Scott's majority.84 However, a strict approach was "usually" adopted,85 imposing a high evidential 
burden on party A by emphasising a "but for" causal link86 and "requir[ing hard] evidence of [party 
A's] loss of earning ability … or enhancement of … [party] B's earning capacity".87 
Commentators,88 policy advisers89 and practitioners90 have criticised this overly restrictive 
approach. The NZLC identified difficulties in establishing causation as a "key issue undermining … 
[s 15's] effectiveness",91 estimating that 20 per cent of cases failed at causation.92 Garland's earlier 
review of 60 cases found 48.3 per cent failed at the causation hurdle.93 These statistics may partly be 
explained by unmeritorious cases where disparities were caused by non-function related causes. 
However, analysis of past case law suggests that deserving claimants have been barred by the strict, 
"unrealistically narrow approach".94 These cases provide the impetus for the assumption. 
As a general criticism, the strict approach incentivises speculative, costly and unedifying evidence 
to be led.95 This article identifies and explores two specific categories that illustrate these general 
issues and pose policy issues of their own. As later argued, the assumption's ability to provide a 
solution makes it a positive development.96  
  
84  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.60]. 
85  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [442] per William Young J. 
86  M v B, above n 3, at [201] per William Young P. 
87  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.60]. 
88  See Nicola Peart and Patrick Mahoney (eds) Brookers Family Law – Family Property (looseleaf ed, Thomson 
Reuters) at [PR15.01]; and Fae Garland "Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976: Compensation, 
Substantive Equality and Empirical Realities" [2014] NZ Law Review 355 at 363–367. 
89  See Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.69] and [19.23]. 
90  See Green, above n 67, at 83, n 267. 
91  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [19.23]. 
92  At [18.44]. 
93  Garland, above n 88, at 359. 
94  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [307] per Arnold J. 
95  At [309]–[310] per Arnold J. 
96  See Part IV(C) below. 
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A First Problematic Category 
The strict approach is problematic where party A "ha[s no] serious career prospects at all" either 
because: (1) party A's work before the DOF was low-skilled; or (2) the DOF occurred before party A 
had the chance to begin a career.97 In Garland's review, 37.93 per cent of unsuccessful causation cases 
stumbled on this point.98 
The difficulty arises from party A's high evidential burden under the strict approach. Courts have 
required "detailed evidence about the availability of positions … which [party A] … was unable, for 
a function based reason, to attain".99 Many claims fail because of "a paucity of evidence about [likely] 
career paths [and] current opportunities".100 However, such evidence is inherently speculative and 
involves guesswork.101 Even claimants with prior careers face difficulties in accurately predicting 
their hypothetical "but for" position on a career pay-scale, but experts can be employed to make 
educated guesses. For such claimants this evidential burden is costly but at least attainable. For 
claimants without prior careers, or with low-skilled jobs, the evidential burden is likely unattainable 
as even experts cannot predict "but for" career paths in such situations. 
Where party A's prior work was low-skilled, the tendency is for low income-earning capacity 
post-separation to "be attributed to … [party A's] lack of skill, training or … ambition" instead of the 
DOF.102 In PEL v FFB, PEL was university educated but her pre-relationship work was low-
skilled.103 Because she "ha[d] not developed prior to … [the DOF] even the beginning phases of a 
career", the court lacked "confidence … [to] establish a but for income".104 
  
97  Atkin, above n 2, at 119. 
98  Garland, above n 88, at 365. See also Joanna Miles "Financial Provision and Property Division on 
Relationship Breakdown: A Theoretical Analysis of the New Zealand Legislation" (2004) 21 NZULR 268 at 
280, n 54.   
99  Walker v Walker [2006] NZFLR 768 (HC) at [116] (emphasis added).   
100  At [115]. See also Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.66], 
n 93 for examples of cases failing at causation due to a lack of evidence of an alternative career. 
101  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [309] per Arnold J; and Green, above n 67, at 331. 
102  Garland, above n 88, at 365, citing Douglas v Douglas [2013] NZHC 3022, [2014] NZFLR 235. 
103  PEL v FFB [2012] NZFC 9534. Unusual circumstances meant the parties' living standards were not disparate, 
despite FFB's significantly higher income. For this article's causation focus, let us assume significant disparity 
was established. 
104  At [70(c)]. 
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Additionally, in these situations the strict approach's emphasis on a "hard"105 causal link 
incentivises party B to lead unedifying evidence minimising party A's skills.106 Party B argues that 
this lack of skill was responsible for party A's low income-earning capacity rather than the DOF.107 
For example, PEL argued she would have been an associate professor absent the DOF.108 In response, 
FFB engaged expert evidence pointing to PEL's "grades, lack of work experience and zero 
publications" to argue that "she … [could not] have got through [even] … the first hurdle of obtaining 
entry into a Masters programme" which was a prerequisite for associate professorship.109 Such 
invidious inquiries exacerbate existing tensions in a break-up context and are "antithetical to important 
[PRA] values".110  
PEL also illustrates the problematic "all or nothing" mentality created by strict causation. As later 
discussed, strict causation goes hand in hand with X v X's quantum methodology that quantifies 
compensation based on the differential between party A's actual and "but for" income.111 If "but for" 
income determines compensation, party A is incentivised to pitch their "but for" income as high as 
possible and sometimes unrealistically so. In trying for it "all", party A often ends up with ‘nothing’ 
even though "something" was deserved. For example, PEL argued that "but for" the DOF she would 
have been an associate professor; no doubt with the motivation of maximising her "but for" income. 
Based on her argument, the question became: did the DOF cause PEL's lost opportunity to become an 
associate professor? The Court unhesitatingly answered negatively given her inadequate 
qualifications for the role. That answer is not criticised. However, it was not the right question. The 
jurisdictional question should be whether a causal link between the DOF and disparity exists. In 
undertaking full-time domestic duties while FFB worked full-time, surely PEL's earning capacity was 
restricted to some extent, or at least FFB's was enhanced. This may not explain the entire disparity 
but jurisdictional causation does not require the DOF to be the sole or principal cause. Common sense 
and socio-economic research indicate that it explains at least some of the disparity, which is sufficient 
to say that a causal link, and hence jurisdiction, exists. Rejecting the possibility of any causal link, 
and hence any compensation, due to an evidentially unsubstantiated "but for" income denies PEL her 
deserved compensation for even that small amount of disparity attributable to the DOF. The 
  
105  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [384] per O'Regan J. 
106  At [310] per Arnold J. 
107  At [309] per Arnold J. 
108  PEL v FFB, above n 103, at [65]. 
109  At [67]. 
110  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [310] per Arnold J. 
111  See Part V(A)(2) below. 
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assumption coupled with Scott's disparity-based quantum approach eschews the "but for" argument's 
relevance, making this problematic "all or nothing" approach less likely. 
CRH v GDH illustrates the strict approach's problematic application when party A had no career 
before the DOF.112 The parties married when CRH fell pregnant aged 16. They had three children. 
During the 34-year marriage, CRH was a "career wife", and GDH the "breadwinner throughout". 113 
CRH failed at causation, inter alia,114 because:115 
[s]he had never developed a career in her teenage years because she had insufficient time. It [was] 
therefore very difficult for her to show that there [was] a detrimental effect on a career development 
because she did not have one in which to develop. 
For claimants like CRH, the strict approach requiring evidence of a "but for" income works an 
injustice.116 Nathan v Nathan held a lack of pre-relationship "qualifications or employment history 
… does not disquali[fy]" party A's claim.117 However, it is difficult to see party A succeeding under 
strict causation. There is no "but for" abandoned career to point to and courts have been unwilling "to 
speculate" in such circumstances.118 Thus a lack of pre-relationship employment is disqualifying in 
reality, albeit not legally.  
Arnold J said it was undisputable that claimants like CRH deserve compensation.119 This is 
correct given Nathan's dictum. Additionally, the legislative history suggests s 15 sought to ameliorate 
this type of mischief.120 For example, the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy lamented that 
"[t]he loss of, or failure to gain, a career [was] not compensable" before s 15.121 Yet the strict 
  
112  CRH v GDH, above n 43.  
113  At [1]. 
114  CRH filed proceedings 13 years after separation. The Court suggested that by then the DOF's effects were a 
spent force and CRH's earning capacity was caused by her personal post-separation decision not to seek full-
time employment or training. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning indicates causation would have failed 
independent of the timing issue, making this case a useful illustration of the strict approach's problematic 
application. 
115  CRH v GDH, above n 43, at [49]. 
116  See Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [307] per Arnold J. 
117  Nathan v Nathan [2004] NZFLR 942 (FC) at [100]. 
118  LD MCL v JP MCL FC Christchurch FAM-2007-009-504, 28 November 2008 at [59]. 
119  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [307] per Arnold J. 
120  Green, above n 67, at 205. 
121  Ivor Richardson and others Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy: Te Kōmihana A Te Karauna 
Mō Ngā Āhuatanga-Ā-Iwi (Government Printer, April 1988) vol 4 at 219 (emphasis added). 
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approach deprives such claimants. Furthermore, the strict approach's reluctance to find causation in 
enhancement claims, discussed below, accentuates such claimants' vulnerabilities.122 
B Second Problematic Category 
Commentators have criticised courts for overlooking enhancement claims.123 Analysis of past 
cases indicates that the rarity of successful enhancement claims is largely attributable to a reluctance 
to find causation, and to quantification difficulties.124 
That one's innate talent, qualifications and work ethic help determine earning capacity is 
uncontroversial. Rather, party A argues that party B's ability to develop talent, receive qualifications 
and possess such a work ethic is because party A's domestic role "freed up" party B to do so. 125 
However, under the strict approach the tendency is to view party B's natural attributes alone as 
explaining the disparity126 absent "factual evidence of [the] degree or amount [of enhancement]"127 
or "some comparative evidence … to enable … [party B's] earnings pattern to be assessed against … 
other[s in similar professions]".128 Adducing such evidence often requires costly expert witnesses to 
attribute numerical values to party A's non-financial contributions. Even then, success is not 
guaranteed as even experts struggle to find foundations for their figures. For example, in Scott an 
expert gave evidence that the DOF enhanced Williams' annual income by $50,000 but accepted in 
cross-examination that this was merely a "judgement".129 The High Court130 and Court of Appeal131 
rejected causation on the enhancement claim due to this lack of evidential foundation. 
  
122  See Part IV(B) below. 
123  See Mark Henaghan "What can you do about inequality post separation and post division?" (paper presented 
to New Zealand Law Society Relationship Property Intensive, August 2010) at 101; Green, above n 67, at 
309; Mark Henaghan and Nicola Peart "Relationship Property Appeals in the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
1958–2008: The Elusiveness of Equality" in Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent New Zealand Court of 
Appeal: Essays on the First 50 Years (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 99 at 101; and Susannah Shaw 
"Disparity in Jack v Jack: Judicial Overreach or a Just Result at Long Last?" (2014) 45 VUWLR 535 at 537, 
nn 11, 12 and 13. 
124  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.52]; and Scott v 
Williams, above n 1, at [203] per Glazebrook J. 
125  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.55]. 
126  Varney, above n 16, at 15. 
127  P v R FC Auckland FAM-2004-004-3234, 30 November 2006 at [47]. 
128  P v P [2005] NZFLR 689 (HC) at [61]. 
129  Scott v Williams [2016] NZCA 356, [2016] NZFLR 499 [Scott v Williams (CA)] at [109]. 
130  Williams v Scott [2014] NZHC 2547, [2015] NZFLR 355 [Williams v Scott (HC)] at [167]. 
131  Scott v Williams (CA), above n 129, at [109]. 
92 (2019) 50 VUWLR 
This is problematic because research and common sense indicate that by undertaking domestic 
duties, party A frees party B to specialise in money making.132 However, absent evidence of the 
degree or amount of enhancement, party A's role is characterised as "merely permissive" rather than 
"truly causative".133 This was so even where party A undertook day-to-day childcare, while party B 
worked long hours, took unscheduled trips and spent 70 days a year overseas.134 Similarly in CRH, 
GDH's earning capacity was attributed to the "very long hours" he worked.135 When one remembers 
that the parties married young when CRH fell pregnant, consequently having two more children, then 
surely at least part of the reason why GDH could work long hours was because CRH undertook 
childcare. This was especially pertinent as both parties entered the relationship with no qualifications. 
GDH undertook an apprenticeship during the marriage, working as an electrician thereafter.136 
Ostensibly CRH could have completed the same apprenticeship, done the same work and had a similar 
earning capacity if she did not have to undertake full-time domestic duties. 
Additionally, "problematic dicta" concerning the "nanny argument" have emerged from the "but 
for" test's application.137 The "but for" focus allows the argument that the DOF did not cause party 
B's enhanced earning capacity because "but for" party A undertaking domestic duties, party B would 
still have devoted as much time and effort towards their career because a nanny would have been 
employed to undertake domestic duties.138 This approach is flawed. It degrades party A's contribution 
to that of a substitute service, thus flouting the PRA's "bedrock" equality of contribution principle.139 
It favours "individualism", attributing party B's high earning capacity solely to party B's individual 
character,140 consequently undermining the PRA's underlying premise of relationships being joint 
enterprises.141 Additionally, focusing on what could have occurred is misplaced given X v X's well-
settled presumption of mutual decision-making.142 Perhaps a nanny could have been employed. 
However for whatever reason, in a traditional DOF relationship, the parties chose not to employ a 
  
132  See Part III above. 
133  DJE v TJAE [2012] NZFC 830 at [140]. 
134  P v R, above n 127, at [47] and [50]. 
135  CRH v GDH, above n 43, at [51]. 
136  At [1]. 
137  Shaw, above n 123, at 538. 
138  See M v B, above n 3, at [201]; and JES v JBC [2007] NZFLR 472 (HC) at [32]. 
139  See Property (Relationships) Act, ss 1M(b), 1N(b) and 18(2); and Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [310] and 
[324] per Arnold J. 
140  Green, above n 67, at 309. 
141  Henaghan, above n 123, at 101. 
142  Jack v Jack, above n 43, at [51]. 
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nanny instead deciding party A would undertake such work.143 The focus must be on the relationship's 
realities and its actual consequences. 
C Solution 
Under Scott, causation would be assumed, subject to rebuttal, in traditional DOF relationships 
such as CRH144 and PEL. In fact, because Scott discards "diminution" and "enhancement" awards at 
quantum, the two problematic categories aforementioned are eliminated altogether.145 Scott's new 
quantum methodology and assumption rely on each other for workability.146 Because separate awards 
are no longer made for diminution and enhancement, separate causative inquiries into diminution and 
enhancement are unnecessary. It is no longer harder for claimants without prior careers or with low-
skilled jobs to succeed, or for enhancement claims to be established. Rather, in traditional DOF 
relationships common sense and socio-economic research allow a sensible assumption that the DOF 
restricted party A's earning capacity and enhanced party B's earning capacity and hence that a causal 
link between the DOF and disparity exists. Consequently, a single award compensating this disparity 
can be made. 
Although not every case has employed the strict approach in the aforementioned scenarios,147 it 
has been the common approach.148 The assumption eliminates the potential for inconsistency and 
better achieves s 15's policy rationale by ensuring an unrealistically strict approach does not deprive 
deserving claimants.  
V STRIKING THE CORRECT BALANCE 
Green explained the causation dilemma as:149 
the inherent difficulty … in achieving the correct balance between being unduly restrictive, rarely finding 
… disparity was as a result of the … [DOF], to lowering the … bar so that the causation test is effectively 
meaningless. 
For the reasons discussed below, amalgamating the majority's jurisdictional reasoning and the 
minority's apportionment reasoning best strikes this balance. 
  
143  Shaw, above n 123, at 539. 
144  Rebuttal may be successful due to reasons discussed at n 114.  
145  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [323] per Arnold J. 
146  See Part V(A)(2) below. 
147  See for example H v H HC Nelson CIV-2006-442-313, 20 October 2006 at [25]. 
148  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.60]. 
149  Green, above n 67, at 55. See also Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [384] per O'Regan J. 
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A Jurisdiction 
In terms of jurisdiction, Green's statement reflects the choice between the strict approach and the 
broad working assumption approach. The assumption's ability to resolve issues caused by the strict 
approach as discussed in Part IV(C), alongside the further reasons discussed below, make the 
majority's assumption the better choice at jurisdiction. 
1 Purpose of causation: text versus policy  
Resolving the dilemma requires analysing why the causation requirement exists. The difficulty is 
that its purpose is unclear, with incongruity between s 15's text and policy rationale.150 
The strict "but for" requirement is certainly an available, if not the most obvious, interpretation of 
s 15's "because of" wording.151 However in causation law, the "but for" test's key limitation is its 
potential non-application where multiple sufficient causes exist.152 In s 15 cases, multiple causes are 
almost invariably at play making a "but for" test unworkable. After all, a "person's income does not 
come down to any one thing but … depends on multiple factors".153 These factors include luck, talent 
and work ethic, but also the DOF. Indeed this is recognised even in cases propounding the "but for" 
test as it is well-settled that the DOF need not be the sole cause of the disparity.154 Consider a situation 
where "disparity is due in equal measure to … [the DOF] and [party B's] … innate skills".155 
Jurisdiction should exist; party A is entitled to some compensation as there is a causal link between 
the DOF and disparity. However, "it is not true of either cause that but for its occurrence, … [a 
disparity] would not have transpired", making neither the DOF nor party B's innate skills a factual 
cause under the "but for" test.156 
Furthermore, as discussed, the strict approach leads to outcomes antithetical to s 15's policy 
rationale.157 For example, a CRH-type claimant has no obvious "but for" career path to point to.158 
  
150  Green, above n 67, at 205.  
151  At 205. 
152  See Steven Yannoulidis "Causation in the Law of Negligence" (2001) 27 Mon LR 319 at 320; and David 
Jackson "Some Thoughts on Causation and Loss of a Valuable Commercial Opportunity" (paper presented to 
TC Beirne School of Law Current Legal Issues Seminar 2: Causation and Loss of Opportunity, Queensland, 
July 2017) at [25]–[26] and [30]–[31].  
153  Green, above n 67, at 55. 
154  M v B, above n 3, at [201]. 
155  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [446] per William Young J. 
156  Yannoulidis, above n 152, at 320. 
157  See Part IV above. 
158  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [307] per Arnold J. 
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Yet various legislative materials recognised the lack of a career option as "a significant economic 
handicap" requiring rectification via s 15.159 Additionally, a "but for" approach justifies the nanny 
argument.160 Yet such arguments are unedifying, contrary to the equality of contribution principle 
and misplaced given the unattractive proposition of courts substituting retrospective judgments of 
how relationships should have been structured.161 
Therefore, although s 15's text points to a "but for" test, theoretically it is unworkable where 
multiple sufficient causes exist. Practically, its implementation creates results contrary to the PRA's 
spirit. Yet the judiciary cannot ignore the causation requirement. Such change is for Parliament.  
However, arguably what courts can and ought to do, in the context of social, non-technical 
legislation162 is discussed in Elias CJ's extra-judicial comments.163 She queried "whether in social 
legislation … it is appropriate for courts … to refine too much on the terms of the statute",164 and 
urged courts to "conscientious[ly] use … powers [granted by] Parliament" to make the legislation 
work as a whole and "in the spirit intended".165 Scott's majority has responded to this request; 
assuming causation in traditional DOF relationships prevents the unedifying and costly inquiries 
required by the strict approach and the injustices of depriving CRH-type claimants and those making 
enhancement claims. Consequently, it upholds the equal contribution principle and the principle that 
PRA disputes "should be resolved as inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with 
justice".166 Importantly, it does so without rendering the causation requirement meaningless. On this 
approach, s 15 could be viewed as "ensur[ing] awards are made if there is a [DOF] … and resulting 
economic disparity".167 The causation requirement's purpose might simply be to weed out exceptional 
cases where the relationship in no way affected the disparity such as a case where party B's $50,000 
inheritance directly explains a $50,000 disparity.168 In such situations, the assumption would be 
  
159  Green, above n 67, at 205. 
160  M v B, above n 3, at [201]. 
161  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [324] per Arnold J. 
162  Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA) at 605. 
163  Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand "Separate Property – Rose v Rose" (speech to Family Court 
Conference, Wellington, August 2011). 
164  At 3. 
165  At 16. 
166  Property (Relationships) Act, s 1N(d). 
167  Law Commission Dividing relationship property – time for change?, above n 10, at [18.66]. 
168  See Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [323] per Arnold J. See also Part V(C) below. 
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rebutted. As later discussed, this article's preference for apportionment further ensures the causation 
requirement remains meaningful.169  
2 Practical workability 
Not only is this "common sense, non-technical view of causation"170 more attractive in policy 
terms, it is justifiable and practically workable given the Supreme Court's new quantum methodology. 
Section 15 does not prescribe a methodology. Until X v X, judicial approaches had "not exactly been 
a model of clarity".171 The Court of Appeal in X v X propounded a methodology premised on the 
differential between party A's "but for" income and actual income.172 Despite warnings that it was 
not a rote formula,173 it "led to a settled period" where many subsequent cases,174 including Scott's 
lower court judgments, employed the methodology.175 
The Supreme Court in Scott shifted the focus away from X v X's "but for" emphasis towards a 
starting point quantum emphasis on relative disparity. Even though s 15 compensates post-separation 
disparity, under X v X nothing turns on party B's earning capacity and calculations occur "irrespective 
of the disparity".176 Thus, X v X's compensation for detriment or advantage was correctly criticised 
as "misconceived".177 
This shift in focus at quantum is directly relevant to the correct causation approach.178 Strict 
causation and X v X's quantum methodology make sense together.179 As X v X compensates party A's 
inability to reach their "but for" income, it is understandable why courts guided by this methodology, 
required strict "but for" evidence of the extent of loss of earning capacity at causation. However, if 
we are prepared to reject X v X's methodology then strict causation creates an unnecessary level of 
analysis and must also be rejected. There is no need to place this significant, potentially unattainable 
evidential burden on party A if detriment to party A is no longer what is compensated. Rather, we can 
assume causation in traditional DOF relationships without precise inquiries into the extent of party 
  
169  See Part V(B) below. 
170  See similarly Moge v Moge [1992] 3 SCR 813 at [115]. 
171  M v B, above n 3, at [271]. 
172  X v X [Economic disparity], above n 8, at [180] per O'Regan and Ellen France JJ. 
173  At [175] per O'Regan and Ellen France JJ. 
174  Atkin, above n 2, at 127; and Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [350] per Elias CJ. 
175  Williams v Scott [2014] NZFC 7616 at [323]–[344]; and Williams v Scott (HC), above n 130, at [158]–[166]. 
176  Atkin, above n 2, at 119. 
177  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [347] per Elias CJ. See also Atkin, above n 2, at 119. 
178  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [291] and [293] per Arnold J. 
179  At [292] per Arnold J. 
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A's loss. Given the jurisdictional hurdle simply requires a causal link, assuming that there is enough 
of a causal nexus for party A to clear the jurisdictional hurdle is justifiable.180 It reflects research and 
hence the likely situation while avoiding the evidential, and now unnecessary, "difficult[ies] … of 
show[ing] loss in the individual case".181  
B Apportionment 
However, this article argues that the above arguments are most justifiable as a matter of 
jurisdiction, if apportionment is undertaken at quantum. Here, it departs from the majority and agrees 
with Scott's minority. Scott's quantum methodology requires "identifying the extent of the disparity 
resulting from the [DOF]".182 If the assumption applies at jurisdiction, the majority's no-
apportionment approach attributes the entire disparity to the DOF at quantum.183  
This article's proposal amalgamates the majority's jurisdictional reasoning and the minority's 
quantum (apportionment) reasoning ("amalgamated approach"). This amalgamation best strikes the 
correct balance, ensuring s 15's "because of" wording is not unduly restrictive, while also ensuring it 
is not rendered meaningless. As discussed, because jurisdiction only requires a causal link, 
jurisdictional causation can safely be assumed in traditional DOF relationships.184 The strength of 
that assumed causal link and the existence of other causes are jurisdictionally irrelevant because the 
DOF need not be the sole, principal, or even real and substantive, cause of the disparity. Provided the 
other jurisdictional hurdles are cleared, a causal link entitles party A to some compensation. However 
when determining quantum, the existence of multiple causes is highly relevant. "[R]elative causal 
responsibility must be determined"185 as only disparity because of the DOF is compensable and not 
disparity per se.186 By ignoring other causal factors, the majority's approach of attributing the entire 
disparity to the DOF risks overcompensation contrary to the statutory wording.  
A potential criticism of apportionment relates to difficulties in determining the proportion of 
disparity caused by the DOF compared to other non-compensable causes. A structured method for 
  
180  See similarly Carol J Rogerson "The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law" (1989) 8 Can J Fam 
L 95 at 132. 
181  See similarly Miles "Dealing with Economic Disparity: An Analysis of Section 15 Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976", above n 15, at 543.  
182  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [326(a)] per Arnold J. 
183  At [326(a)], n 420 per Arnold J. 
184  See Part V(A)(2) above. 
185  Miles "Financial Provision and Property Division on Relationship Breakdown: A Theoretical Analysis of the 
New Zealand Legislation", above n 98, at 295; de Malmanche v de Malmanche [2002] 2 NZLR 838 (HC) at 
[166]; and Atkin, above n 2, at 123. 
186  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [384] per O'Regan J. 
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making this assessment may well be by reference to each party's "but for" income. This would provide 
a precise indication of the extent of disparity demonstrably referable to the DOF.187 However, such 
an exercise would require the same type of speculative and costly expert evidence that the working 
assumption seeks to ameliorate, making the assumption's benefits seem illusory. The only difference 
would be that this evidential requirement is postponed from causation to quantum. 
However, apportionment need not follow such technically precise methods. As O'Regan J noted: 
"a broad [apportionment] approach … is appropriate".188 Where multiple causes exist:189 
… [it is not] necessary … to adduce expert evidence of the extent to which [party A's domestic] … role 
… enhanced [party B's] … future income and living standards [or restricted party A's]. The Judge … 
need[s] to make a broad assessment taking into account the qualifications and career stage of the partners 
when the relationship began and when [it] … ended, the period for which the functions were divided, 
what, in broad terms, the respective functions were and any other relevant matters. 
Despite creating additional analysis, apportionment should not be ignored "if a just result is the 
aim".190 Contrary to Arnold J's comments, apportionment is not "incapable of rational resolution".191 
Judges are capable of, and experienced in, making such assessments similar to those undertaken in 
contributory negligence.192 In fact, certain aspects of Arnold J's judgment are evocative of 
apportionment. He conceded that personal characteristics could sometimes provide a "partial 
explanation" of disparity and if so, "it may be that only part of the disparity can fairly be said to result 
from the [DOF]".193 His subsequent no-apportionment approach is inconsistent with these 
pronouncements.  
C Rebuttal 
The amalgamated approach is further justified as it provides a better solution to the problematic 
implications created by the assumption's rebuttable nature. The corollary of the assumption being a 
rebuttable presumption194 is that it imports a reverse burden on party B for rebuttal.195 Whether party 
B's burden is evidential or legal is unclear. A legal burden would be problematic, fitting 
  
187  See generally at [294] per Arnold J. 
188  At [386] per O'Regan J. 
189  At [386] per O'Regan J (footnote omitted). 
190  Atkin, above n 2, at 123. 
191  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [324] per Arnold J and [449]–[450] per William Young J. 
192  At [450] per William Young J. 
193  At [325] per Arnold J (emphasis added). 
194  See Part II(A)(3) above. 
195  See similarly Henaghan and others, above n 61, at 1106. 
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"uncomfortably within this legislative regime" that simply requires courts "to be satisfied about a state 
of events which … exists".196 It would also appear incongruous given the well-settled position that 
party A bears no legal burden.197 In fact, Arnold J cited X v X which disclaimed a legal burden on 
"any party".198 Yet, the majority's language suggests the burden "is more than evidential"199 with 
"little room" allowed for rebuttal.200  
Even an evidential burden would attract criticism. Given the issue with the strict approach was 
party A's high evidential burden it would be ironic for the working assumption solution to remove 
that difficulty for party A by shifting it to party B. Put this way, all the assumption does is shift 
causation from something party A tried to establish to something party B tries to knock down.  
However, this shift is justifiable as it better reflects the usual reality in traditional DOF 
relationships. After all, before Scott, courts essentially worked from a different presumption: that no 
causal link existed absent strict evidence of the DOF's impact on earning capacity.201 In a choice 
between presumptions, Scott's assumption (or presumption) is the better choice. The alternative 
presumption is less attractive in that it unrealistically "presume[s] a model of [relationships] … in 
which [partners] … make independent economic choices and are hence responsible for their own 
economic positions", rather than acting in the interests of their joint enterprise.202 
More problematically, the assumption's rebuttable nature casts doubt on its avowed purpose to 
remove speculative, unedifying and costly evidence previously led. O'Regan J validly queried whether 
it would truly "reduce the extent to which evidence is adduced by [party B]", noting that one would 
"expec[t] that attempts will be made to [rebut the assumption]".203 
The majority may respond to O'Regan J by noting that the high threshold dissuades frivolous 
rebuttal as only "compelling"204 evidence of causes "clearly independent of the [DOF]" suffice.205 
However, the majority's no-apportionment approach makes it unclear how strongly party B will be 
  
196  M v B, above n 3, at [39]. 
197  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [292] per Arnold J. 
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dissuaded. The no-apportionment approach incentivises party B to try their utmost to rebut the 
assumption with the type of strong, yet costly and potentially unedifying, evidence envisaged. If not, 
party B will have to compensate for the entire disparity. 
Conversely under the amalgamated approach, a prudent solicitor could advise party B against 
rebuttal unless something truly independent of the DOF exists that provides a complete explanation 
for the disparity. A debilitating illness suffered by party A, a large inheritance received by party B, or 
situations where significant disparity exists but is lesser than the disparity when the relationship began 
might provide these complete explanations.206 Adducing evidence of causes providing partial 
explanations of the disparity is futile because jurisdiction is still established provided the DOF has a 
causal effect. Party B need not fear that they may be forced to overcompensate for the entire disparity 
where other causal factors exist. In such situations, courts will apportion the causes to determine a fair 
starting point compensable disparity.207 Or more simply, a solicitor may advise party B that the 
assumption "sends a clear signal" that in traditional DOF relationships, party A is entitled to some 
compensation.208 Therefore party B's efforts are best spent focusing on negotiating a fair quantum 
settlement, thus avoiding the time, money and stress consumed by litigation.  
VI FRAMING THE WORKING ASSUMPTION 
A remaining issue is whether the majority correctly framed the assumption as arising in 
relationships conducted along traditional lines. Given "traditional lines" is likely to mean role-
divisions where party A undertakes primary responsibility for home-making and childcare and party 
B for income-earning,209 this article agrees with the majority's idea of when the assumption should 
arise. However, the "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology creates unnecessary 
confusion. We should simply say that, subject to rebuttal, in relationships where party A has 
undertaken primary responsibility for domestic duties and party B for income-earning, causation is 
assumed ("primary responsibility notion"). This framing is justified when the alternatives are 
considered. 
One alternative is to look to different types of relationships – heterosexual or homosexual 
marriages, de facto relationships, or civil unions – and consider whether the assumption should arise 
in any, or all, of these relationships. However, such categorisation tells us nothing about the DOF nor 
how it relates to disparity. Provided a relevant role division exists, the type of relationship is irrelevant 
especially given that, alongside s 15, the PRA's extension to such relationships was the headline of 
  
206  At [213] per Glazebrook J and [323] per Arnold J. 
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the 2001 reform.210 Thus, the "traditional lines" terminology should be eschewed. Although the 
majority was focusing on traditional role-divisions, that language can create misconceptions that the 
assumption only arises in the "traditional" heterosexual marriage with a breadwinning husband and 
housewife.  
Another alternative is to consider the different role-divisions undertaken by New Zealand couples 
and consider whether the assumption should arise in any, or all, of those situations. Based on 2016 
data of couples with dependent children, three statistical categories emerge:211 
• "Unemployed/full-time" (33 per cent): Party A does not undertake paid work. Party B works 
full-time. 
• "Part-time/full-time" (22 per cent): Party A works part-time. Party B works full-time. 
• "Full-time/full-time" (45 percent): Party A works full-time. Party B works full-time. 
Again, framing the assumption as against these statistical categories is unhelpful. For example, 
although causation was conceded in Scott, it was accepted to be a traditional DOF relationship.212 
Scott was the primary caregiver and often worked part-time. Williams worked full-time throughout. 
This might incline us to say that the assumption arises in part-time/full-time relationships. But that 
misses the point. The reason why the assumption would arise is not by virtue of there being a part-
time/full-time relationship, but because Scott worked part-time so that she could undertake primary 
responsibility for domestic duties which restricted her income-earning capacity and freed Williams to 
enhance his.  
This point is most pertinently illustrated when considering full-time/full-time relationships. 
Statistically, this is the most common role-division.213 However, statistical categorisations are over-
simplistic for causation purposes. Querying whether the assumption should arise in full-time/full-time 
relationships is not the right question to ask. An instinctive answer is that it should not arise. Arguing 
that party A "freed up" party B to focus on their career seems unconvincing given party A, like party 
B, worked full-time. Similarly, one might query how party A's earning capacity was restricted if they 
too continued full-time work. This thinking has influenced past cases where claimants who worked 
full-time have found establishing causation difficult.214 
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212  Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [299] per Arnold J. 
213  Law Commission Relationships and Families in Contemporary New Zealand, above n 65, at 39. 
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However, instinctive answers hide the various permutations within these statistical categories. A 
full-time/full-time relationship could be one where both parties continued "to enjoy full careers 
unimpeded, or at least equally impeded by domestic responsibilities".215 In such situations, it is 
difficult to argue the assumption should arise. But full-time/full-time relationships could also be ones 
where party A has a "double burden" by working full-time and also undertaking "a far greater portion 
of domestic functions" than party B.216 In such situations, party A does free party B to specialise in 
money-making. It may not be to the same extent as if party A did not work at all, but it is still more 
so than if the parties equally shared domestic duties. Similarly, party A could have worked full-time 
but sacrificed their lucrative, yet inflexible career, with inconsistent hours, in favour of a less lucrative, 
9–5 job to ensure they could undertake childcare at night. Meanwhile, party B continued in the same 
lucrative, yet inflexible career, often away for whole days at a time.217 In such situations, the DOF 
has restricted party A's income-earning capacity as it is easy to get left behind in professional careers 
after protracted absences.218 It also allowed party B to continue to cultivate their earning capacity in 
a lucrative field unburdened by domestic duties. 
What this analysis illustrates is that the focus ought to be on whether party A undertook primary 
responsibility for domestic activities allowing party B to focus on career tasks unimpeded, or less 
impeded, than if party A did not undertake these domestic responsibilities. Focusing on whether party 
A was unemployed, worked part-time, or full-time is unhelpful. To take the full-time/full-time 
example: a proposition that the assumption arises in all full-time/full-time relationships is overbroad 
as that includes situations where both parties worked full-time, unimpeded, or equally impeded by 
domestic activities such that no causality between the DOF and disparity exists. However, to say it 
never arises in full-time/full-time relationships fails to reflect the fact that in many such relationships 
party A may "declin[e] a promotion, refus[e] a transfer … or otherwise curtai[l] employment 
opportunities" in the interests of the family, thereby suffering disadvantage while enhancing party B's 
earning capacity.219  
A misplaced focus can lead to the type of unattractive reasoning seen in JA v SNA [Economic 
disparity] where both parties entered the relationship as trainee teachers and worked full-time 
throughout.220 At separation, SNA was a principal while JA was still a teacher earning considerably 
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less.221 Since child-rearing and economic sacrifices are stereotypically expected from mothers, the 
DOF's detrimental impact on JA's earning capacity was rejected.222 The High Court accepted the 
Family Court's reasoning223 that it was "inevitable [JA] … would play a larger part in the children's 
lives"224 and that "[l]ike many other women, she juggled her career aspirations with competing calls 
on her time".225 Economic advantage to SNA was also ignored. To that extent, Scott's "non-career 
partner" terminology should be eschewed, as it prevents the assumption arising in a JA-type situation 
where party A had a career but undertook primary domestic responsibility to their disadvantage and 
party B's advantage. 
This primary responsibility notion does not create evidential difficulties or require party A to 
positively prove that they undertook primary responsibility for domestic duties. The approach is 
summarised below:226 
[A]n exact tally of debits and credits for each day of the … [relationship is not required]. … It is clear that 
certain things must be done to maintain a family. Income must be earned. Food must be bought and 
prepared. Children must be cared for. … [I]t will suffice if the parties tell the … [court] in a general way 
what each did. That will allow the … [court] very quickly to get an accurate picture of the sacrifices, 
contributions and advantages relevant to determining compensation[.] 
The court can then assess whether party A undertook primary responsibility for domestic duties. If so, 
causation is assumed, subject to rebuttal, and apportionment at quantum. 
Some residual injustices in terms of relativity may remain. An assumption framed to focus on the 
primary responsibility notion assumes causation in situations where party A undertook no paid work 
and was fully devoted to domestic activities, in situations where party A split time between the two 
and even in situations where party A worked full-time but still undertook a greater proportion of 
domestic duties. The causal link is prima facie strongest in the first situation and weakest in the last. 
If the amalgamated approach is adopted, the apportionment exercise will ensure these differences are 
recognised when courts determine compensable disparity. Prima facie, in the first situation a high 
proportion, if not all, of the disparity will be apportioned to the DOF. In the last situation, perhaps 
only a small proportion of the disparity will be apportioned to the DOF given the disadvantage to 
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party A, or advantage to party B, is less pronounced than unemployed/full-time situations where party 
A devoted all their time to domestic duties. 
Another uncertainty is whether the assumption only arises in long-duration relationships, with 
children and which were entered into early in adult life. These factors are mentioned throughout Scott's 
judgments, no doubt influenced by Scott and Williams' 26-year two-child relationship.227 William 
Young J's conceptualisation of the majority's assumption includes long-duration relationships as a 
prerequisite.228 Glazebrook J and Elias CJ tended to emphasise this factor,229 albeit expressing broad 
support with Arnold J's reasoning.230 Arnold J does not consider it a prerequisite. For him, a long-
duration relationship with children and entered into early in adult life simply means the assumption 
would be particularly strong, and rebuttal would be highly unusual, compared to shorter-duration, 
childless relationships entered later in life.231  
It is understandable why long-duration relationships could be singled out because "the longer the 
… [relationship], the greater the probability of economic integration between the [partners]" in their 
joint enterprise.232 However to avoid disputes as to what qualifies as sufficiently long, and given 
Arnold J provided the assumption's fullest exposition, it is safe to assume causation whatever the 
relationship's length. Similarly, a childless relationship entered into later in life should not in itself 
disentitle a claimant from the assumption's benefits. Provided party A undertook primary 
responsibility for other domestic duties the assumption should still arise. However, the fewer the 
childcare duties or the shorter the relationship, the easier it will be for party B to rebut the assumption 
completely or to argue for greater apportionment on the amalgamated approach. Similarly, in 
relationships entered later in life, which are becoming increasingly common,233 party B is more able 
to whittle down the assumed causal link by arguing that they entered the relationship having already 
established the high earning capacity they continue to boast of post-separation.234 
The vast diversity of relationships makes it difficult to set adequately specific prerequisites to 
capture relationships where the assumption should arise, while excluding those where it should not. 
The better approach is to set more general, fundamental requirements leaving rebuttal and 
apportionment exercises to ensure the strength of the causal link is fairly reflected at quantum. This 
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is also justified because Scott does not discuss what occurs if the assumption does not arise. Is party 
A not to have a claim? Or is the strict approach to be applied? That would be incongruous given the 
strong criticism of the strict approach's speculative, costly and unedifying evidential burden. The more 
claimants that are able to utilise the assumption's benefits of removing this evidential burden, the 
better. A broad assumption formulation, with a single prerequisite of party A undertaking primary 
responsibility for domestic duties and party B for income-earning, facilitates this outcome without 
losing its justifiable, theoretical peg. After all, research and common sense indicate that where party 
A undertakes primary responsibility for domestic duties and party B for income-earning, the 
assumption is not unfounded.235 The relationship's length, when it was entered into and other relevant 
factors simply enhance or reduce the strength of the assumed causal link. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Section 15's laudable rationale has not translated into practical success. A strict, and now 
unnecessary, causation approach has been a key barrier. Thus Scott's working assumption, which 
eschews the strict causation approach, is a positive development in terms of satisfying jurisdiction. 
However, Scott's majority was wrong to reject apportionment at quantum as it risks overcompensating 
party A for disparity not attributable to the DOF which is contrary to the statutory wording. Adopting 
this article's amalgamated approach better assists in striking the correct balance between s 15's broad 
policy rationale and stricter "because of" wording. Furthermore, Scott's "traditional lines" and "non-
career partner" terminology should be avoided in framing the assumption.  
Thus, the ideal proposition is: at jurisdiction, causation is assumed in relationships where party A 
has undertaken primary responsibility for domestic duties and party B for income-earning regardless 
of whether party A also undertook paid employment. If truly independent causes provide a complete 
explanation for the disparity, the assumption will be rebutted. Otherwise, the existence of other causes 
in addition to the DOF will be appropriately reflected through a broad apportionment exercise at 
quantum. 
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